Beyond Katrina

Katrina 3-Year Coverage: New Institute report finds faith groups "critical" to long-term rebuilding

The Institute of Southern Studies has just released a report on the contribution made by faith based groups in Hurricane Katrina recovery - see Chris Kromm's wonderful post on the subject, here.  I very much concur with Chris' observations:

After Hurricane Katrina struck three years ago, faith and religious groups mounted an unprecedented response that made them the go-to resource for tens of thousands of storm victims. Now, as New Orleans and coastal Mississippi struggle to rebuild, the expertise, resources and commitment of faith groups will be an indispensable ingredient to the success of long-term revitalization of the Gulf Coast.

Do go check out his full post - it's a great read.

Download the Report via the following link:Download FaithGulf.pdf

 

Report: Federal aid falls far short of hurricane rebuilding need

NEW ORLEANS --While $126 billion in federal aid is projected to reach the Gulf Coast following the 2005 hurricanes, about 40 percent - $51 billion - is going toward rebuilding, a new report states, suggesting the need for continued aid in the slowly recovering region. Continue at SunHerald.com

Report: N.O. population 63 percent of pre-Katrina

NEW ORLEANS - Nearly two-thirds of the city's pre-Hurricane Katrina population has returned, a new report shows. But Greg Rigamer, the demographer who compiled the report, said today that he expects the growth seen since July 2006 to plateau within the next year as the sense of urgency to return lessens. Rigamer, whose company, GCR & Associates, has been tracking demographics in post-Katrina New Orleans, said an estimated 288,000 people were living in New Orleans in October. In July 2005, the month before Katrina hit and left 80 percent of the city flooded, the population was estimated at 455,000. Continue at New Orleans City Business.

Nonprofit Community Plays Critical Role in Recovery

For the complete text of the report, please visit:

www.rockinst.org/gulfgov or www.la-par.org

The Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana and the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government today released a report on the important role the nonprofit community has played in hurricane recovery efforts across Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. GulfGov Reports:Response, Recovery, and the Role of the Nonprofit Community in the Two Years Since Katrina and Rita examines the role of the nonprofit sector in the recovery, what impact hurricanes Katrina and Rita have had on the work of these organizations, and what changes they already have made to handle the next disaster that strikes.

In contrast to the criticism that seems to accompany almost every aspect of the governmental recovery effort, the consensus among local officials, residents, and outside observers is that the nonprofit sector has responded to the rebuilding challenge beyond all expectation.

“The scope of the nonprofit community’s work in helping the Gulf Coast region rebuild has been unprecedented,” said Jim Brandt, president of PAR and co-principal investigator for the GulfGov Reports project. “It has included everything from national foundations investing millions of dollars in the recovery to out-of-town groups making frequent rebuilding trips to locally based groups lobbying for policy changes. There is no question that the nonprofit community is helping to push the recovery forward.”

Immediately after the storms, organizations that had never been involved in disaster relief and recovery work looked for ways to help. Small churches that really were not equipped to handle sizable numbers of evacuees opened their doors anyway, and their congregations responded. Normally staid foundations cut through paperwork and procedures to get money out quickly to organizations and agencies working directly in the affected areas. Well-established nonprofits performed double duty, taking in their counterparts from the devastated areas at the same time that their client loads increased. As the immediate crisis passed and the affected communities settled in for the long recovery, the nonprofit sector moved with them.

This study finds that nonprofit, community-based, and faith-based organizations remain more important than ever in the recovery efforts. By examining the groups cited in this report, one gets a picture of the variety of these organizations and the different strengths they bring to the recovery. In addition, some common issues and concerns emerged from the research:

• The wide-ranging impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita required the nonprofit sector to be adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances. It was not so much the missions of these groups that had to be altered. Rather, it was the scope of the work that changed as the demand and the need for services exploded.
• The critical need for a disaster response and recovery plan was reinforced. Many nonprofit organizations did not have such a plan before Katrina and Rita. Now they do. Other groups that had plans found they had to revise them.
• Funding sustainability is a serious problem. More than two years after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, many groups are running out of the money they need to keep providing elevated levels of service.
• The role and coordination of volunteers are major concerns for state and local governments. Everything from work assignments to housing, food, and transportation must be coordinated so that volunteers can be sent where they are most needed. That encompasses both the response and recovery phases of disasters.

“Studying the nonprofit community’s response to Katrina and Rita and how nonprofit organizations worked with government at all levels offers us another opportunity to gain insight into how best to respond to disasters,” said Dr. Richard P. Nathan, co-director of the Rockefeller Institute and co-principal investigator for the GulfGov Reports project. “It is critical that we take heed of the lessons learned here so that we can be better prepared for the next time. This fifth report from our three-year study focuses a flashing red light on the need for mechanisms to enable a leading organization in disaster situations to pull things together to make and oversee working connections among nonprofit and community-based groups. This is a vital part of the hard work of managerial leadership on the ground. Laws should be in place so that such mechanisms will be established at the ‘get go’ with adequate financial support to maximize and coordinate the contributions of volunteer groups to help address both human and infrastructure needs.”

Nonprofit, community-based, and faith-based organizations are well-suited to help out in disaster response and recovery. They are flexible, they can adapt their missions, they can marshal resources, and they can get around stultifying paperwork. But even the most efficient, well-run, well-funded nonprofit group has a limited reach. For all of the work that the nonprofit sector has done and continues to do in the hurricane recovery effort, it is still more akin to a drop in the bucket rather than a giant wave.

The scale of the devastation is so vast in Louisiana and across the Mississippi Gulf Coast that only government has the capacity to handle significant rebuilding. The role of the nonprofit sector was not meant to replace government as the primary driver of the recovery. Rather, it was to buttress the governmental response, to fill in the gaps. For the recovery to proceed in a timely and substantial way, government must take the lead while nonprofit, community-based, and faith-based organizations play a strong supporting role with their focus on the human element of any disaster.

This report is part of an ongoing research project being conducted jointly by the Rockefeller Institute and PAR with the help of a grant from the Ford Foundation. In addition, the John C. Stennis Institute of Government at Mississippi State University and the Center for Urban Planning and Policy Assessment at Jackson State University are partnering in the research network for this project, as are researchers affiliated with Louisiana State University, the Southern University Law Center, and McNeese State University. The Advisory Committee for the project is chaired by former Mississippi Gov. William F. Winter.

The report is available online at www.rockinst.org/gulfgov or www.la-par.org.

Previous reports also available online include:

• GulfGov Reports: One Year Later
• GulfGov Reports: A Year and a Half after Katrina and Rita, an Uneven Recovery
• GulfGov Reports: Education. An Examination of the Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
• GulfGov Reports: Spending Federal Disaster Aid. Comparing the Process and Priorities in Louisiana and Mississippi in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Source: PAR

First Report on Migration Patterns Across South Louisiana Released Today

From: The Louisiana Recovery Authority

Study shows overall impact of Katrina and Rita on parish populations

BATON ROUGE, La. (August 7, 2007)-Today, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) released findings from the first study of post Katrina and Rita migration patterns across South Louisiana. This study, known as the Migration Patterns Report, identifies parishes that experienced significant population losses in the aftermath of the 2005 storms and indicates to which parishes these individuals have relocated. The report also highlights regions that experienced significant population gains and indicates from where these individuals migrated.

"Katrina and Rita initially displaced hundreds of thousands of people across South Louisiana," said Dr. Calvin Mackie, a member of the LRA Board of Directors. "This displacement and the unprecedented losses and gains in overall population have had a significant impact on parish planning and resources. We hope this report will begin to fill a critical data and information void about our citizens-one that is needed to make informed policy choices and investments in our long-term recovery."

Key findings of this study include the following:

• Orleans parish had the largest out-migration in total numbers. Migrants from Orleans parish tended to be dispersed further away with about two-thirds of the out-migrants moving beyond the surveyed parishes or out of state.
• Percentage-wise, St Bernard had an even greater loss with about three-fourths of its pre-Katrina population leaving the parish. About one-third of those displaced out of parish went to St Tammany parish and approximately another third went outside of the survey area or out of state.
• The more rural parishes of Plaquemines and Cameron also had significant losses. However, in these parishes a higher percentage was able to relocate within the same parish and more were able to relocate elsewhere in Louisiana.
• There were a high number of migrations within each parish; an estimated 46,000 Orleans parish residents moved elsewhere in Orleans due to Katrina; Plaquemines and St Bernard both had about 5,000 residents each move within the parish boundaries. Cameron parish had about 2,000 residents move within the parish; compared to 2,600 residents that relocated outside the parish due to the hurricanes.
• Jefferson parish ranked second in overall storm-related out-migrations with about 70,000. Like Orleans, Jefferson parish evacuees were generally dispersed further. In addition, they had significant challenges with 35,000 displacements within parish while picking up approximately 51,000 in-migrants from other devastated parishes such as Orleans, St Bernard and Plaquemines.
• Despite losing an estimated 10,000 residents due to the storms, St Tammany parish actually experienced a population gain with an influx of about 15,000 from the southern impacted parishes. A larger number of these in-migrants came from St Bernard parish than the much larger Orleans parish.
• Simultaneously they had over 15,000 residents move within parish due to the storms and they picked up another 5,000 or so residents not related to the storms.

The complete report is available online at http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/MigrationReport_FINAL.pdf

The estimates described in this report are based on the 2006 Census Bureau annual population estimates combined with updated data collected from door-to-door surveys in 18 parishes across Southern Louisiana. These surveys were conducted approximately 15 months following the hurricanes in the following parishes: Ascension, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, Iberia, Jefferson, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St Charles, St. Helena, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion and Washington.

Surveys were conducted by the Louisiana Public Health Institute on behalf of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and the Louisiana Recovery Authority, with technical assistance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Census Bureau. Complete and updated survey results - including demographic breakdowns, insurance coverage information and more from the 2006 Louisiana Health & Population Survey - are available online at www.popest.org

The LRA's Migration Patterns Report was released in conjunction with two other studies conducted by the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps and researchers at Louisiana State University (LSU).

The Recovery Corps survey, titled Where Did They Go and Are They Coming Back, provides an analysis of displaced Louisianans living in other states and discusses barriers they have identified to returning. This report is available online at www.recoverycorps.org.

The Louisiana FEMA Park Survey, which was conducted by LSU and the LSU AgCenter on behalf of the Recovery Corps, the Department of Labor, and the LRA, includes information about the past, present and future plans of trailer park residents in addition to information about their education, health, employment and income status. This report is available online at www.lra.louisiana.gov.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated South Louisiana, claiming 1,464 lives, destroying more than 200,000 homes and 18,000 businesses. The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) is the planning and coordinating body that was created in the aftermath of these storms by Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco to lead one of the most extensive rebuilding efforts in the world. The LRA is a 33-member body which is coordinating across jurisdictions, supporting community recovery and resurgence, ensuring integrity and effectiveness, and planning for the recovery and rebuilding of Louisiana. To learn more, visit www.lra.louisiana.gov.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Releases Hurricane Protection Decision Chronology

        By: United States Army Corps of Engineers
        Published: Jul 11, 2007 at 08:36

                  

          The United States Army Corps of Engineers today released the draft Hurricane Protection Decision Chronology (HPDC) for the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LP&VHPP) in the Greater New Orleans area. The report is being released for a 30-day public comment period during which time the report's authors are soliciting any additional relevant documentation that was not available to them while compiling the draft.

The HPDC is an exhaustive examination of the complex 50-year record of LP&VHPP decision-making and project implementation involving the Corps, local sponsors, government at all levels, and the courts.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, John Paul Woodley, Jr., and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Director of Civil Works, Major General Don Riley, commissioned the HPDC shortly after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States on August 29, 2005.

Woodley said, "The Hurricane Protection Decision Chronology, while important because of what it tells us about the past, will be of even greater value as a national resource for planners and decision-makers to make better future decisions about the nation's critical public works infrastructure.

"This is an opportunity to learn from the past to inform the future."

The report was to provide an explanation, as opposed to an evaluation, of how Corps policies and organization, legislation, and financial and other factors influenced the decisions that led to the LP&VHPP that was in place when Katrina struck.

The HPDC is a separate, but complementary, report to the Corps- commissioned Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force study that analyzed the performance of the LP&VHPP during hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The HPDC seeks to answer the "why" and "how" of the hurricane protection system that was in place when Hurricane Katrina made landfall by documenting the record of decisions, planning and design that led to that system. The IPET report is a "what happened" record of the system's performance during the hurricanes.

Donald Powell, Chairman of the Gulf Coast Rebuilding Office, said, "I commend the Army Corps of Engineers on commissioning this independent study. Such a thorough analysis is an important step toward greater transparency and accountability in the decision-making and budgeting process.

"This report speaks to the commitment of the Corps and its leadership to communicating risk and providing quality engineering services to the nation."

The Corps Institute for Water Resources commissioned an independent study team of Drs. Douglas Woolley and Leonard Shabman, water resources planning and policy experts, to conduct the HPDC inquiry and prepare the report. The draft HPDC is based on all known available records related to the LP&VHPP in the custody of the Corps and of limited records volunteered by the state and local governments.

The HPDC was reviewed by the Corps to help identify missing documents and errors of logic, and externally reviewed by the National Association of Flood and Stormwater Management Agencies.

Maj. Gen. Don T. Riley, Director of Civil Works for the Corps, said, "Both the chronology and the IPET studies have contributed in meaningful ways to the ongoing hurricane damage reduction work we are doing around New Orleans and to the Corps' new initiatives.

"The Chronology in particular serves to emphasize the importance of using systems approaches in our public works infrastructure; adaptive management over the life of projects; and the critical importance of understanding risk management and effectively communicating that risk to the public and decision makers," said Riley.

The Hurricane Protection Decision Chronology is available on the internet at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/hpdc/hpdc.cfm. The public comment period to submit relevant additional documentation runs though August 10, 2007.

The Lessons of the Levees

MIAMI, Jul 12 (IPS/IFEJ) - Despite mounting data that storms coming out of the Gulf of Mexico could bring catastrophic flooding to the U.S. Gulf Coast, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) failed to implement a proposed barrier plan in New Orleans that would have used floodgates to keep storm surge out of Lake Pontchartrain and the canals leading into the city. A self-assessment released Wednesday by the USACE said that a long-term budget crunch, flawed levee design and shoddy construction materials all contributed to the disaster. "There were 53 breaches (of levees) in greater New Orleans due to Katrina," Sandy Rosenthal, executive director of Levees.org, a citizens oversight group, told IPS. "At the base of our discontent is the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. There's been plenty of mea culpas from them, but there's been no change in the day-to-day operations of the Corps here," she said. Continue Here.

What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Income, Race, and Fairness

Source:  Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Faculty Research Working Paper Series

We investigate determinants of private and public generosity to Katrina victims using an artifactual field experiment. In this experiment, respondents from the general population first viewed a short audiovisual presentation that manipulated respondents’ perceptions of the income, race, and deservingness of Katrina victims in one of two small cities. Respondents then decided how to split $100 between themselves and a charity helping Katrina victims in this small city. We also collected survey data on subjective support for government spending to help the Katrina victims in the cities.

We find, first, that our income manipulation had a significant effect on giving; respondents gave more when they perceived the victims to be poorer. Second, the race and deservingness manipulations had virtually no effect on average giving. Third, the averages mask substantial racial bias among sub-groups of our sample. For instance, whites who identify with their ethnic or racial group strongly biased their giving against blacks while whites who do not identify with their ethnic or racial group biased their giving in favor of blacks. Finally, subjective support for government spending to help Katrina victims was significantly influenced by both our race and deservingness manipulations, but not by the income manipulation. White respondents supported significantly less public spending for black victims and significantly more for victims who were described in more flattering terms, such as being helpful and law-abiding.

+ Full Paper (PDF; 1.76 MB)

NASA OIG: Final Memorandum on the Audit of Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Assignments for Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief

STATUS REPORT
Date Released: Monday, July 9, 2007
Source: NASA Office of Inspector General

 

Full Report

TO: Chief Financial Officer

FROM: Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

SUBJECT: Final Memorandum on the Audit of Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Assignments for Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief (Report No. IG-07- 01 8; Assignment No. A-05-030-02)

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has completed an audit of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mission assignments for Hurricane Katrina disaster relief. The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) Homeland Security Roundtable was established to coordinate reviews from Offices of Inspector General auditing Federal relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In conjunction with the PCIE, NASA OIG reviewed NASA's Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. In two prior reports¹ we addressed NASA's emergency preparedness plans and its processes for estimating and expending direct costs related to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. This report focused on NASA's accounting for reimbursable costs for Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts authorized by FEMA. We reviewed NASA's accounting for FEMA funding authorizations totaling $541,500 for four reimbursable mission assignments. ² We also reviewed NASA's accounting for funds related to a $12.6 million FEMA funding authorization to NASA for an interagency agreement. (See Enclosure 1 for details on the audit's scope and methodology.)

Executive Summary

We found that NASA had properly accounted for funding related to the $12.6 million interagency agreement. NASA also properly accounted for one of the reimbursable mission assignments that incurred costs. One reimbursable mission assignment did not incur any costs and was closed. For the two remaining mission assignments that incurred costs, those costs were improperly accounted for as direct costs. Also, the mission assignments' costs were not separately tracked and were allowed to exceed the funding authorization amount. This occurred primarily because Headquarters personnel did not follow NASA's guidance for establishing separate work breakdown structure (WBS) codes³ for reimbursable projects. Instead, Headquarters personnel followed NASA guidance for tracking direct costs for Hurricane Katrina efforts. In addition, NASA did not provide monthly progress reports, as required by FEMA, until September 2006. Stennis and Headquarters personnel did not comply with FEMA's guidance because they were unfamiliar with FEMA mission assignment requirements and had difficulty coordinating with FEMA points of contact. As a result, NASA lost visibility over the costs for two of the reimbursable mission assignments and exceeded the FEMA funding authority by approximately $1.7 million. NASA sought and obtained reimbursement of $1.3 million after this office inquired as to the accounting for the funding for mission assignments. However, NASA could not provide separated costs to recoup the remaining $700,000 for these two mission assignments prior to expiration of FY 2005 funds. Hence, these funds were unavailable to support Space Shuttle Program requirements.

In our May 14, 2007, draft of this memorandum, we recommended that the Chief Financial Officer ensure that Headquarters Project Officers use reimbursable project WBS codes to account for cost incurred in support of FEMA mission assignments, rather than direct cost codes. We also recommended that the Chief Financial Officer ensure Headquarters and Center Project Officers are aware of and comply with FEMA's mission assignment requirements to provide monthly progress reports that include cost and billing data.

Management concurred with both recommendations and their planned actions are responsive (see Enclosure 2). The recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of management's corrective action.

¹ NASA Office of Inspector General. "NASA's Implementation of the National Incident Management System" (IG-06-016, August 29,2006); and "Audit of the Management of Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief Efforts" (ML-06-009, August 29,2006).

² A mission assignment is a work order used by FEMA to support Federal operations in the event of a Stafford Act major disaster declaration. It orders immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, necessary recovery work.

³ A WBS project code is used to track project costs. A WBS code can be divided into different levels that can be used to identify reimbursable projects.

Full Report

RAND Study Says Hurricane Katrina Response Shows Need To Tailor Some National Guard Units For Disaster Work

June 4, 2007 -- The U.S. Army should change the way it plans for domestic emergencies — both natural disasters and terrorist attacks — to better support state and local first responders, according to a RAND Corporation report issued today.

Studying lessons offered by the response to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, RAND researchers recommend the Army create 10 regional task forces in the National Guard to focus on preparing for and responding quickly to future domestic emergencies.

In addition, the National Guard should formally be given the federal mission to conduct homeland security activities, just as it does for counter-drug operations, according to the report.

“We believe the best way to improve the Army's response to domestic disasters is to empower the National Guard for a regional focus,” said Lynn Davis, lead author of the RAND report. “The experience of Hurricane Katrina also demonstrates that new strategies are needed to prepare Army forces of all types for domestic emergencies.”

Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath caused enormous physical destruction and human suffering, but it also offers lessons for how the nation can better prepare for natural disasters and large-scale terrorists attacks, according to the RAND report. The most important problem was the speed with which local, state and federal civilian organizations were overwhelmed, but the military response also had shortcomings in the critical first few days.

The report from RAND, a nonprofit research organization, suggests each of the new National Guard regional task forces be responsible for one of the 10 multi-state planning regions used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The 900-member regional task forces would be able to respond to disasters within 18 hours to provide support to local and regional civilian agencies that are the first on scene.

“There was plenty of warning before Katrina and the nation's response fell short for those stranded in the New Orleans Superdome and convention center, and in homes across Mississippi and Louisiana,” Davis said. “There may be no warning before future domestic emergencies, particularly those that may be caused by terrorists.”

The report, prepared for the U.S. Army by the RAND Arroyo Center, also recommends speeding up the National Guard response across state lines by:

* Making each National Guard unit capable of rapid deployment and having state governors ready to call up units and not just wait for volunteers.
* Establishing plans to use the Air National Guard or commercial air services to fly designated National Guard units to out-of-state emergencies.
* Creating programs that allow the new regional task forces to train regularly with local first responders, including law enforcement officials, as well as other units that are focused on counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Giving the National Guard a federal mission for homeland security would help provide access to the funding needed for creation of the regional task forces and for training.

The RAND report also suggests ways the Army's unit readiness process could be used to achieve quick and more robust responses for not only the National Guard, but also for active-duty units.

The efforts by civilian and military responders in the days following Hurricane Katrina and the breach of the levees was unprecedented, with nearly 50,000 people rescued, 80,000 evacuated, and more than 230,000 provided with emergency shelter at the peak. About 45,000 National Guard and 21,000 regular Army and Marine personnel responded to Mississippi and Louisiana in the two weeks following Hurricane Katrina.

The magnitude of the Katrina response is analogous to potential requirements in other catastrophic emergencies, according to the RAND report. So changes made as a result of Hurricane Katrina can be helpful for a broad range of such future emergencies.

The study, titled “Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations,” is available at www.rand.org.

Other authors of the report are Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer and Laurinda L. Zeman.

The Arroyo Research Center provides objective analytic research on major policy concerns to leadership of the U.S. Army, with an emphasis on mid- to long-term policy issues intended to improve effectiveness and efficiency. The Arroyo Research Center also provides the Army with short-term assistance on urgent problems and acts as a catalyst for needed change.

Source: RAND